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Abstract
Since the Treaty of Lisbon, national parliamentary chambers in the European Union can issue rea-
soned opinions on legislative proposals by the European Commission. These individual reasoned
opinions lead to a review if at least one third of all chambers raise such concerns. Hence, coordi-
nation among parliaments is key. Using advances in inferential network analysis, this article infers
the underlying diffusion pathways among national parliaments through which chambers are related
to each other in their decisions to raise subsidiarity concerns. The emerging diffusion network is
characterised by a compartmentalization into communities of European Union budget net contrib-
utor and net recipient countries. This descriptive finding has implications for the institutional effec-
tiveness and aspired democratic legitimacy of the Early Warning System. A multivariate statistical
network analysis confirms that diffusion occurs among net recipient countries and that weak insti-
tutions follow the lead of strong institutions in the Early Warning System.
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Introduction
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced stronger regional and national institutions into the
European polity in December 2009. One of these institutions is the Early Warning System
(EWS), which gives national parliaments the opportunity to scrutinise, and raise subsidi-
arity concerns about, legislative proposals made by the European Commission. Through
the EWS, national parliamentary chambers can achieve that the Commission has to re-
view a legislative proposal if the parliaments reach a threshold of one third of all cham-
bers voicing concerns. This process is called a yellow card.1 Although this mechanism
is still rather a ‘weak’ instrument from an output-oriented perspective – because the Com-
mission can ultimately keep the legislative proposal in its original form – it is one of the
few innovative institutional arrangements to increase the democratic legitimacy of inter-
national and supranational organisations.
The main activity within the EWS – and the empirical basis of almost all previous
studies – is the submission of a reasoned opinion by an individual national parliament.
After an initial wave of conceptual research on the new powers and potentials of
democratic legitimacy of national parliaments in the EU (Crum and Fossum, 2009;
Cooper, 2012), a first empirical wave of studies analysed the EWS as a tool in which na-
tional chambers issued their reasoned opinions independently of each other (Gattermann
1There is also an orange card if one half of all parliaments raises subsidiarity concerns. Although never realised so far, the
Commission would be forced to review the proposal, and if it decides to maintain its proposal, the Commission must justify
its decision to the EU Parliament and Council as to why the proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity.
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and Hefftler, 2015; Williams, 2016; Huysmans, 2018). A second wave of empirical
studies now challenges the conceptual thought of independent chambers, which was so
far a building block of the empirical results. Building on case study evidence from the
previous yellow cards (Cooper, 2012; Pintz, 2015; Fromage and Kreilinger, 2017), these
studies now start from the assumption of interdependent national parliaments that
communicate, coordinate, and maybe influence each other in the process of raising sub-
sidiarity concerns (Buzogány, 2013; Sprungk, 2013; Cooper, 2015; Pintz, 2015; Fromage
and Kreilinger, 2017; Malang et al., 2019). Research has shown that the EWS can be
characterised as a temporal network of interacting parliamentary chambers from the dif-
ferent Member States in order to explain submission behaviour: Chambers influence each
other along partisan lines in order to coordinate around joint subsidiarity concerns as a
form of collective action (Malang et al., 2019).
In the present contribution, we adopt a macro perspective and ask how the repeated
(inter)action within the EWS creates a network of diffusion pathways among the na-
tional parliaments. We assume that a central feature of the EWS is the dynamic interde-
pendence among national parliaments because they repeatedly face a common set of
choices of importance to each other, namely whether to state a reasoned opinion or
not on a legislative proposal. While one can easily observe the individual opinion sub-
missions by national chambers, empirically identifying the emergent network of diffu-
sion pathways – a concept of substantial theoretical interest and valuable for
predicting future opinion behaviour – is a non-trivial and innovative contribution. We
apply, for the first time in the study of the EWS, a general method for inferring a diffu-
sion network connecting national parliaments based only on their publicly observable
submission of reasoned opinions.
The stable diffusion network is the backbone of the ideological coordination and social
influence documented in the literature on the EWS. Our article maps and explains this
network. Moreover, we discuss how and why this network is crucial for understanding
the diffusion process of reasoned opinion submissions. In other words, which parliaments
influence which other parliaments in their decision to raise concerns on a proposal? What
communities of parliaments exist in the European Union that exert influence on each
other, and how are they structurally connected or divided? Who are the net distributors,
or ‘opinion leaders’, in the diffusion network? And do the observed communities match
any cleavage lines known to scholars of European Union politics?
The results speak to the burgeoning literature on parliaments as “networkers” by re-
vealing the topology through which parliaments in the European Union are connected
and exploring who learns from whom (Kinski, 2020). Our contribution also advances
the literature on political and legislative networks (Victor et al., 2017) by analysing a su-
pranational institution with recent methodological innovations in social network analysis.
I. Theoretical Background: Diffusion Pathways
The Early Warning System has upgraded the powers of national parliaments in the
European Union since the Treaty of Lisbon: every legislative draft is sent by the Commis-
sion to all national parliaments for scrutiny. Each chamber can scrutinise the drafts for a
violation of the subsidiarity principle and can formulate a reasoned opinion to signal their
concerns. We call such an individual reasoned opinion simply ‘opinion’ or ‘concern’
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throughout the paper. If a draft legislation is interpreted as a violation of the subsidiarity
principle by at least one third of the votes of all chambers (19 votes),2 the European
Commission must review the draft, it can, however, maintain the original version after re-
view. All lower and upper chambers of all EU states can participate in the EWS. Each na-
tional parliamentary chamber has one vote in bicameral systems and two votes in a
unicameral system, resulting in 56 votes in total. The parliaments have a short time span
of eight weeks from the transmission by the Commission to the formulation of the
reasoned opinion. If a chamber concludes that a given proposal violates the subsidiarity
principle, it uploads the reasoned opinion on the EU interparliamentary exchange (IPEX)
platform where all other chambers can see the concern. This implies that a chamber that
formulates the concern can signal its interest as to which proposal they want to change or
block and all other chambers receive this cue of which proposal might be worth
scrutinising more closely.
Conceptual work has highlighted the new role of national parliaments as ‘networkers’
(Sprungk, 2013). This literature casts national parliaments as a ‘virtual third chamber’ in
EU decision making (Cooper, 2012), which is characterised by a diffusion of activities,
practices, and institutions (Buzogány, 2013; Senninger, 2020). Yet, the network character
of national parliaments in the EU is empirically under-researched. Most empirical studies
focus on single cases of yellow cards (Cooper, 2015; Pintz, 2015; Fromage and
Kreilinger, 2017), activities of specific chambers, or on factors of chambers that increase
their probability to issue opinions, without considering the activities of all other chambers
(Gattermann and Hefftler, 2015; Williams, 2016). While some recent studies emphasise
the collective nature of the EWS process and conceptualise either the national parliaments
as a collective actor (Auel and Neuhold, 2017) or the EWS process as a collective action
problem (Malang et al., 2019), no empirical study so far has analysed the interdependent
activity by mapping who influences whom in this network of concern activities. Conse-
quently, Huysmans (2018) concludes that there is a need for a systematic study of
inter-parliamentary co-operation between national parliaments in the EU.
Right from the beginning of the EWS, the network character of the system became ap-
parent. On the political and administrative level, several organisational and virtual plat-
forms were established to foster coordination and cooperation among the parliaments.
As Dias Pinheiro (2016) shows through the reconstruction of the development of forums,
national parliaments do have a natural incentive to cooperate with peer chambers after
Lisbon. Most importantly, the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs
of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) intensified the exchange between na-
tional chambers by its meetings. On a virtual level, the IPEX platform was created for
real-time monitoring and coordination of activities related to the EWS – including the
posting of reasoned opinions and political dialogues (Goldoni, 2016).
The EWS provides an ideal environment for diffusion processes by encouraging par-
liaments to look at, or learn from, each other. The Member States share many similarities
and dissimilarities, including spatial location, type of welfare state, public opinion toward
the EU, shared history or language, and economic benefits from the EU, some of which
we will consider below as explanations of the diffusion network. This means that Member
States are connected in several ways, and as a key result, national parliaments in the EWS
2This threshold is lower for draft legislative acts related to justice, freedom and security – one quarter.
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might look at specific chambers when deciding if a given policy proposal is worth
scrutinising. Hence, reasoned opinions might spread throughout the Member States.
Two tasks result from this: (1) to focus on single-policy opinion episodes to examine
the micro-level activities of national parliaments in coordinating and cooperating the
EWS, and (2) to look for consistent patterns of opinion diffusion between Member States
at the macro level by describing the general connectedness and presenting explanatory
factors to predict interdependent behaviour.
While a wealth of excellent scholarship already exists on the single-policy approach,
which focuses mostly on the ‘most successful’ cases (in terms of number of reasoned
opinions), we want to examine the foundational question if diffusion structures exist in
the EWS when we take into account the whole universe of policies.
To do so, we begin by adopting a very simple and general definition of diffusion. Spe-
cifically, diffusion occurs when one chamber’s decision about whether to submit a rea-
soned opinion is potentially influenced by the choices made by other chambers
(Simmons et al., 2006; Graham et al., 2013). Put another way, opinion submission can
be interdependent, where a chamber observes what other chambers have done and condi-
tions its own decision to formulate a subsidiarity concern on these observations.
In addition to characterising reasoned opinion diffusion in terms of interdependence,
the definition emphasises diffusion as a process, as opposed to an outcome (Gilardi, 2012).
Our research interest focuses on the interdependent process that is conducive to the spread
of reasoned opinions, not the extent of convergence that can result from it. Hence, we are
not so much interested in the yellow cards, which would be the focus of convergence re-
search (Holzinger and Knill, 2005), but the observable sequence in the process of EWS
activity. This procedural knowledge is, at a more fundamental level, linked to understand-
ing and predicting the likelihood of an outcome (for example a yellow card) and the dem-
ocratic quality of the EWS.
What are the persistent diffusion pathways in the EWS? In line with Walker (1969) in
his pioneering study of policy diffusion, there are two primary pieces of information that
need to be stitched together in order to conceptualise these pathways. We try to determine
(1) if a group of parliaments exists that serves as ‘opinion leaders’ and (2) how reasoned
opinions spread from these pioneering early submission chambers throughout the whole
EWS. Persistent diffusion pathways are sequences of opinion submission in which the ini-
tiating chamber shows the same submission pattern as its following chambers more fre-
quently than randomly expected. By extension, the latent network of opinion diffusion
is set up by stable patterns of opinion leaders and chambers that raise their subsidiarity
concerns with a higher likelihood after these opinion leaders.
II. Conceptualising Opinion Cascades in the EWS
How can we identify opinion leaders and stable diffusion patterns? As in other diffusion
studies, we need two crucial pieces of information: Who did something with respect
to a given policy/legislative proposal (Requirement 1), and at which point in time
(Requirement 2)? Both pieces of information are available for the EWS and can be
generated for every legislative proposal for the whole time period for every chamber.
We identified every reasoned opinion for every legislative proposal since the begin-
ning of the process in the IPEX database. Overall, our study consists of all 484 reasoned
Thomas Malang and Philip Leifeld4
© 2021 The Authors. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons
Ltd.
opinions by individual chambers from January 2010 until April 2019 (the activity of a
chamber on a proposal, as formulated in Requirement 1). We then hand-coded the dead-
line dates and subsidiary concern dates for each parliament and each legislative proposal
(Requirement 2). More information about distributions and crucial cases can be found in
Cooper (2018) and in Online Appendix 1.
We model parliamentary chambers as nodes in a directed network – the unobserved, or
latent, diffusion network. There can only be a tie between two chambers if one chamber
(the sender) submitted reasoned opinions before another chamber (the receiver) about the
same legislative proposals. These ties – or diffusion pathways – are assumed as stable
over time, like an institutional backbone that permits parliaments to coordinate around
opinions. To the best of our knowledge, there is no reason to believe that this backbone
changed fundamentally over the study period, apart from stochastic temporal fluctuation.
The network is directed because the temporal data on the chambers’ individual opinion
activities permit inferring who raised concerns about a proposal first and who followed.
The prediction of the unobserved diffusion network among parliaments is based on the
observed temporal sequences of subsidiarity concerns by individual chambers. These se-
quences for each legislative proposal are called ‘cascades’ because the model assumes
that opinion-relevant information for each legislative proposal spreads through the diffu-
sion network over the respective eight-week period in which parliaments can raise subsid-
iarity concerns. As will be argued below, mere sequentiality of opinions in these cascades
is insufficient for establishing diffusion; sequential opinions of any two chambers must be
observed more often than chance would predict.
Figure 1 shows four selected cascades as an illustration. For example, proposal
COD/2016/0133 is a regulation to manage migration. In this cascade, the Hungarian Na-
tional Assembly posted its opinion that the regulation violates the subsidiarity principle
very early in the process, only a few days after the scrutiny process had begun. For
Figure 1: Four Examples of Opinion Cascades (out of a Total of 191 Cascades). ‘1’ and ‘2’ Indicate
First and Second Chambers of a Bicameral System.
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Hungary, migration was a salient topic, which led to a high incentive to act as an
influencer. The second chamber that submitted an opinion was the National Council of
the Slovak Republic, on day 12 of the cascade around this proposal.
The literature on the EWS has provided case-based empirical evidence that earlier opin-
ions influence later concerns by other chambers: In the case of the first yellow card, Monti
II (APP/2012/0064 in Figure 1), Cooper (2015) demonstrates that the Danish Folketing
played the role of an ‘initiator’, acting rapidly to adopt the first reasoned opinion, ‘based
on a conscious decision to try to persuade other national parliaments to do so with the
expressed goal of achieving the first yellow card’ (Cooper, 2015: 7). Within the cascade
of the second yellow card – a regulation on the establishment of the European Public
Prosecutor’s Office (APP/2013/0255) – Pintz (2015: 99) concludes that the first opinions
had a first-mover function and took on a leadership role in the process. This materialized in
encouraging other parliaments to join the scrutiny process, providing substantive informa-
tion, and monitoring the other parliaments regarding the vote count. Finally, in the process
of the latest yellow card on the revision of the Posted Workers Directive (COM/2016/0128
in Figure 1), Fromage and Kreilinger (2017) attribute an agenda-setting function to the first
chamber with an opinion, the Czech Chamber of Deputies, and conclude about the remain-
ing opinions that ‘it is most likely that coordination of some sort also took place among
these national parliaments’ (Fromage and Kreilinger, 2017, p. 145).
Apart from the evidence of the yellow card dynamics, we also find hints in the litera-
ture on how individual chambers actively try to use the EWS as a network. For the Dutch
Tweede Kamer, qualitative evidence exists that they do not only use administrative and
legislative networks to actively seek information on other parliaments’ positions of given
proposals, but that they also actively try to influence other parliaments through represen-
tatives of the Dutch Parliament in Brussels (Högenauer, 2015; Neuhold and
Högenauer, 2016). Overall, there is consistent qualitative evidence in the literature that
the EWS works on the basis of interdependent chambers that perceive and react to each
other, which suggests the diffusion processes within the system should be investigated
further.
Two concerns could be leveraged against the application of the diffusion concept to the
EWS. First, one could argue that parliaments act completely independently without any
reference to, and perception of, each other and hence the whole diffusion concept should
not be applied to the EWS. However, the description of selected cases above already
hinted towards coordinated activity of chambers within the EWS, and, furthermore, the
whole setup of the institution and the common IPEX database seems to suggest an inter-
dependent system of activity. As soon as a chamber starts scrutinising a subsidiarity con-
cern, the obvious first activity would be to check if other chambers have already started
the process. Efficiency (namely looking for templates or hints on which proposals might
be worth scrutinising) as well as effectiveness (in terms of reaching a given threshold)
suggest this reading of the process. Furthermore, there is existing quantitative evidence
on patterns of influence between chambers in the EWS (Malang et al., 2019).
A second concern could be related to the temporal aspect of the EWS and the chambers
acting in it. We stipulate in our study of diffusion that every subsequent submission is po-
tentially influenced by previous opinions. This is a more conservative operationalisation
of diffusion than found in other studies, which allow policy choices to be simultaneous or
anticipatory, especially by introducing a strategic element into the interdependent choices
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(Franzese and Hays, 2006; Baybeck et al., 2011). In an extreme case, if two chambers
submit opinions with a time lag of one day between the first and the second opinion in
a potential diffusion dyad, the model assumes that the later chamber took the previous
submission into consideration (though this may not be sufficient for inferring a diffusion
tie if it happens rarely). Since parliaments are collective bodies and every decision takes a
certain amount of time, it seems rather unlikely that a parliament is able to react within
one day. Hence, the assumption to equate any temporal distance as a potential channel
of influence could undermine our results. To substantiate our results, we will therefore
provide complementary qualitative evidence and offer several descriptive insights about
the temporal realisations on the level of the chamber, the cascades (the sequence of all
opinions about one proposal), and ties (the inferred diffusion pathway between two cham-
bers) below in the Results section. As a first reassurance, the aforementioned scenario
with the one-day lag is rather uncommon. Of the 40 diffusion pathways that our analysis
identifies, 15 ties have an average temporal distance that is smaller than seven days, and
only two of the 40 pathways are built on an average duration smaller than three days.
Let us take a more systematic look at the activities of chambers in the EWS. Figure 2
plots the number of reasoned opinions per chamber on the y-axis (on a log scale). We can
see that Sweden has the most active chamber when it comes to the submission of subsid-
iarity concerns. The Riksdagen formulated 85 reasoned opinions in the observed time pe-
riod, followed by the second chambers of France (34 opinions) and Austria (30 opinions).
Beyond the sheer quantity of opinion submissions, the central component of our study
is the pace of formulating them within the EWS. The x-axis of Figure 2 displays how
Figure 2: Scatterplot of Opinion Activity and Timing for Each Parliament.
The latent diffusion network in the EWS 7
© 2021 The Authors. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons
Ltd.
much time passed on average after a legislative proposal was submitted by the
Commission.
Both measures, the number and pace of submissions, can be interpreted as attributes of
chambers without any relational component between chambers. We are, however, inter-
ested in the interdependent dimension of the EWS. The colour shade of the points in
Figure 2 indicates to what extent chambers served as sources of diffusion – that is,
opinion leaders – in the estimated diffusion network (as measured by the square-root-
transformed number of outgoing ties, also known as outdegree centrality). All three
characteristics – quantity, pace and opinion leadership – are moderately correlated with
each other, with some outliers. For example, the French Assemblée Nationale and
Slovakia’s parliament are relatively fast and raise a few concerns each, but they do not
act as particular sources of diffusion because other chambers do not follow their lead in
particularly systematic ways.
III. Methodology: Network Inference and Diffusion Pathways
The method we use to infer the diffusion network that structures the observed cascades is
the NETINF algorithm (Gomez-Rodriguez et al., 2012). It was introduced to the field of
political science by Desmarais et al. (2015), who inferred the likely diffusion pathways
between American states over many different policies, given the states’ adoption times
of these policies. NETINF assumes that an unobserved, latent, stable diffusion network
between the nodes (here: parliaments) generates the observed cascades of adoptions (here:
recorded subsidiarity concerns and their timing for the different legislative proposals). It
infers this diffusion network by considering the exponentially decayed waiting times be-
tween the different actions on each sequence as an indicator of likely pathways of diffu-
sion. We employ the R software implementation of the method in the NetworkInference
package by Linder and Desmarais (2019).
The NETINF approach is based on three steps (following the exposition in
Gomez-Rodriguez et al., 2012): First, it defines the probability of one node to transmit
information to another node on a specific cascade as a function of the exponentially
decayed waiting time that passes between any two actions on the cascade. The probability
that node A ‘infected’ node B is relatively high if they both are active in close temporal
succession and relatively low if a lot of time has passed between their actions.
Second, it defines the probability to observe a specific cascade, namely a specific dif-
fusion sequence, or tree pattern. For each cascade, several plausible trees can be con-
structed that are compatible with the observed timings. The probability of any specific
tree is the product of the dyadic infection probabilities in the cascade from the first step.
Third, it defines the probability of observing the cascade given the diffusion network.
This is the sum of the probabilities of the different tree candidates per cascade from the
second step. The product of these probabilities forms the likelihood function for observ-
ing the whole set of cascades.
We illustrate the basic procedure with an example. Take the Romanian Chamber of
Deputies. As Figure 2 indicates, they submitted ten reasoned opinions. In the data sup-
plied to the NETINF algorithm, the Romanian parliament is part of 35 activities as a po-
tential receiver, that is, in these ten policy proposals of the Commission where they issued
an opinion, 35 times another chamber issued an opinion earlier. In six out of ten
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proposals, this was the case for the Czech Chamber of Deputies and four times for the
Swedish parliament. Then, the Dutch Tweede Kamer and Slovakia followed with three
earlier opinions (and 14 different other chambers with fewer than three earlier opinions).
This makes the chambers of the Czech Republic and Sweden strong potential sources for
Romania because each could be used to explain around half of Romania’s opinions. In-
deed, it turns out that NETINF adds exactly these two ties to the diffusion network and
drops the other ones, as our results later in Figure 4 show.
The estimation is conducted using a greedy algorithm, which starts with an empty dif-
fusion network and subsequently adds ties that have the highest contribution to the log-
likelihood, with decreasing contribution to the goodness of fit of the model. The user
can specify a cut-off value for adding ties to the diffusion network.
In our application, we set the cut-off threshold to 40 ties, for three reasons: (a) this
includes all ties that make a major contribution to the model fit (as per the marginal im-
provement); (b) this number of ties is still interpretable in network diagrams; and (c) this
choice includes all diffusion ties that have p-values lower than 0.05, and very few be-
tween 0.05 and 0.10, according to the Vuong test implemented in the NetworkInference
package (Linder and Desmarais, 2019). These choices are depicted in Figure 3, which
plots the cut-off value as a grey vertical bar.
Finally, after inferring the diffusion network using NETINF, we used spinglass com-
munity detection (Reichardt and Bornholdt, 2006), a graph clustering technique
Figure 3: Cut-off Value, Improvement in the Log Likelihood per Additional Tie, and p-Values for
Each Tie According to the Vuong Test, for the First 170 Ties. The Same Cut-Off Value of 40 Ties
Was Used for the Analysis Presented in the Main Text and an Outlier-Corrected Diffusion Network
without the Swedish Parliament, which Can Be Found in Online Appendix 4.
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implemented in the igraph R package (Csardi and Nepusz, 2006), in order to identify
blocks of parliaments that were connected to each other but were sparsely connected to
the rest of the network. Spinglass community detection was chosen due to its ability to
produce moderately-sized communities in directed networks.
IV. Descriptive Results: Diffusion Pathways between National Parliaments
The inferred diffusion network is shown in Figure 4. Hyperplanes indicate cluster mem-
bership. Red ties represent ties that bridge clusters. Chambers that have no diffusion ties
as identified by NETINF are omitted from Figure 4. For the 40 most influential diffusion
ties, we end up with 28 chambers, including 20 lower chambers and 8 upper chambers.
We will first focus on cluster memberships and then on the roles of individual nodes
and ties in our interpretation.
The inferred network reveals a clear separation between Eastern European and Baltic
countries on the one hand and Western and Southern European parliaments on the other
hand, with the Scandinavian countries Denmark and Sweden taking a bridging position.
Figure 4: Inferred Diffusion Network with Communities. Nodes with Suffix ‘1’ and ‘2’ Denote
First and Second Chambers, Respectively. A Version of this Diffusion Network without the
Swedish Parliament Can Be Found in Online Appendix 4.
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As expected, the Swedish parliament occupies the most central role due to its sheer vol-
ume of activity.
The community detection algorithm finds four clusters based on the 40 diffusion ties
identified by NETINF. Two of these (purple and turquoise) are comprised of Central
and Eastern European as well as Baltic countries that joined after 2004. The third (green)
cluster is the largest and most central one, with many bridging positions between clusters.
It also contains the most heterogeneous group of national chambers, encompassing the
BeNeLux chambers, the complete Northern enlargement cohort, the small states Cyprus
and Malta as well as Sweden at the centre. The fourth cluster (red) is comprised of both
French and German chambers as well as the Austrian Federal Council. Member States
from the Southern enlargement cohort are only included through the Spanish Cortes
Generales in this cluster.
If successful yellow cards are a function of the mobilising potential of individual
chambers, which chambers can maximize the prospects of successful collective action?
If we focus descriptively on the chambers that are the sender of many diffusion pathways
(the outdegree centrality), we can see that Sweden is the dominant chamber with 11 out-
going ties (with four links to chambers of other clusters). The next four chambers on this
scale could be interpreted as relative opinion leaders within the respective clusters, with
the Czech House of Representatives (4 outgoing ties), the French Senate (3), the Polish
Sejm (3), and the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (3).
A deeper look into case study evidence suggests several potential driving factors for
the outgoing ties. The Swedish parliament (a) has a very good administrative routine in
writing opinions and (b) has a different role conception of the Early Warning System,
interpreting it as a form of governmental control and a form of European policy making,
relative to the other chambers (Hegeland, 2015). The Czech Chamber of Deputies is de-
scribed as a parliament that has one of the best accesses to governmental information
sources – one senior member of the parliamentary administration described this access
explicitly as “better than the Swedish Riksdag” (Hrabálek and Strelkov, 2015: 499). This
access together with the increased speed of delivery seems to make the Czech first cham-
ber an influential early adopter of subsidiarity concerns. In contrast, the French Sénat has
substantially reorganised its internal procedures to be faster in the subsidiarity process
(Thomas and Tacea, 2015). First, the Sénat has a working group on subsidiarity that is
composed of only one representative per party group, which accelerates the scrutiny pro-
cess. Second, the group leaves aside all content-related issues of a draft (the political com-
ponent) and comments only on matters of subsidiarity (the legal component). This might
lead to an additional acceleration of the process, but furthermore, once this non-political
emphasis of the Sénat is known amongst other chambers, it could be a strong signal that a
proposal really is critical on the subsidiarity dimension and should be scrutinised further.
One of the potential pitfalls of the NETINF algorithm described above is that the tem-
poral distances between two opinions from different chambers could be too small to be
interpreted as a reaction or influence. If we deleted the pathways that were on average
smaller than seven days, two clusters would stay completely unchanged, namely the
red and the turquoise communities.3 In the central green cluster, Sweden initiates five
paths that could be contested on the grounds of temporal proximity (to NL1, RO1, IE,
3An overview about the temporal distribution of all 40 ties can be found in Online Appendix 2.
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FR2, DK). Additionally, both of the Irish and Cypriote paths are shorter than one week.
The same holds for all three Lithuanian outgoing ties. Taken together, this robustness
check highlights a few potentially implausible ties (for example, why should Cyprus in-
fluence both Dutch chambers?) while generally supporting the results and overall network
structure.
V. Statistical Results: Understanding the Inferred Network
Most EWS studies examine the influence of chamber or Member State attributes on the
probability of opinion formulation. It seems straightforward to apply this explanatory ap-
proach also to explaining diffusion pathways. However, since we change the perspective
from a pure variable-based approach to a relational one, additional dyadic explanations
should be incorporated in the explanation of whose opinions diffuse to whom. The net-
work likely arises from a variety of Member States’ and chambers’ attributes and their re-
lationship to each other, drawing on spatial, economic, political, and cultural factors. We
will present such an analysis below, but also emphasise its exploratory character because
it constitutes theory building as much as theory testing.
In this analysis, we evaluate the structure of the inferred network through the lens of
extant theoretical expectations about the identities of leaders and followers in European
politics. The analysis tests if an attribute of a chamber or a Member State can predict net-
work ties. These attributes enter the model in two ways: as an attribute of a chamber (for
example, chambers with a higher capacity are more likely to be diffusion sources or dif-
fusion targets, respectively) and as a distance or similarity between two chambers (for ex-
ample, chambers from the same enlargement round have a higher probability of a
diffusion relation). The binary dependent variable indicates whether there is an inferred
diffusion tie between a sender and receiver chamber. The results will be substantiated
through qualitative references to the respective clusters of Figure 4.
We estimated an additive and multiplicative effects network (AMEN) model
(Hoff, 2005, 2020) as implemented in the amen package (Hoff, 2015; Hoff
et al., 2020), an extension of a generalised linear regression model with a logit link func-
tion by a bilinear latent space component (Hoff, 2005) and random effects for senders, re-
ceivers, and dyads (Hoff, 2020). We chose this model over its alternatives because our
theoretical specification does not contain any explicit statements on the endogenous de-
pendence to be expected between observations and it is easier to estimate in this situation
since all dependencies are simply absorbed into the (bilinear) latent space component and
the random effects (Cranmer et al., 2017). The results are reported in Table 1. Online Ap-
pendix 3 contains details on model specification and multiple imputation.
For an exploration of the potential driving factors of cluster formation, we started with
variables that had shown a stable effect on opinion behaviour in previous studies, exclud-
ing factors that varied over time (Gattermann and Hefftler, 2015; Malang et al., 2019) be-
cause the inferred diffusion pathways vary only cross-sectionally. A description of all
variables can be found in Online Appendix 3.
The first set of factors we tested for association with the inferred diffusion network re-
volves around geography and transnational attachment. Most diffusion studies and qual-
itative EWS studies assume that the location of a country will have an effect via
contiguity. Chambers will look at neighbouring parliaments as a source of information
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on which proposals to scrutinise, hence a contiguous relationship between two chambers
should increase the likelihood of a diffusion tie. We included a factor that controlled
whether chambers were within the same country to account for the possibility that rea-
soned opinions diffused among them at higher rates. Relatedly, one could view enlarge-
ment rounds as a more encompassing proxy for the spatial component of the EU
(which is critical for the EFTA round with Austria being a non-contiguous state to
Finland and Sweden). Finally, Deutschmann et al. (2018) correlate contiguity with trans-
national attachment between European societies. We used all four measures in our analy-
sis. Whereas our qualitative view on the diffusion network suggested that at least three
clusters with a spatial interpretation appeared (the two Central and Eastern European ones
Table 1: Regression of Inferred Network Ties on Monadic and Dyadic Covariates
Coef SE z-val p-val
(Intercept) 6.63 3.27 2.03 0.04
Geography, transnational attachment, and enlargement round
Sender and receiver are geographically contiguous 0.27 0.45 0.60 0.55
Sender and receiver are in the same country 2.24 1.02 2.20 0.03
Transnational attachment between sender and receiver 0.05 0.03 1.41 0.16
Sender’s enlargement round (from 1 to 8) 0.09 0.25 0.36 0.72
Receiver’s enlargement round (from 1 to 8) 0.01 0.16 0.09 0.93
Sender and receiver joined the EU in the same enlargement round 0.29 0.42 0.69 0.49
Chambers’ ability to act in the EWS
Sender’s power 10.22 31.14 0.33 0.74
Receiver’s power 11.20 20.92 0.54 0.59
Absolute difference between sender’s and receiver’s power 17.94 13.16 1.36 0.17
Sender’s power is smaller than receiver’s power 0.09 0.52 0.18 0.86
Sender’s capacity 0.31 1.50 0.21 0.83
Receiver’s capacity 0.79 0.97 0.82 0.41
Absolute difference between sender’s and receiver’s capacity 0.38 0.70 0.55 0.58
Sender’s OPAL score 4.84 3.09 1.56 0.12
Receiver’s OPAL score 0.26 1.90 0.13 0.89
Absolute difference between sender and receiver on OPAL score 2.85 1.59 1.79 0.07
Budget
Sender’s budget in billion euro 0.14 0.10 1.43 0.15
Receiver’s budget in billion euro 0.09 0.06 1.47 0.14
Sender and receiver are both net recipients 2.09 0.89 2.36 0.02
Sender and receiver are both net contributors 0.07 0.74 0.09 0.93
Public mood
Sender’s euroscepticism 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.92
Receiver’s euroscepticism 0.05 0.04 1.23 0.22
Absolute difference between sender’s and receiver’s euroscepticism 0.04 0.04 1.01 0.31
Random effects
Random effect for senders: within-row covariance 1.83 3.27 0.56 0.58
Random effect for receivers: within-column covariance 0.32 0.24 1.33 0.18
Random effect for dyads: sender-receiver covariance 0.20 0.43 0.46 0.64
Within-dyad correlation (rho) 0.01 0.37 0.04 0.97
Residual variance across dyads 1.00 0.00 0.00
True positives (mean) 17.50
False positives (mean) 0.00
True negatives (mean) 716.00
False negatives (mean) 22.50
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and the one with German, Spanish, French and an Austrian chamber), the quantitative
analysis does not statistically support the claim of a spatial effect: neither direct contigu-
ity, nor same enlargement round, nor transnational attachment can be identified as signif-
icant predictors of diffusion, given the data and model. Only if two chambers are in the
same country, a relationship is significantly more likely than if they are in different coun-
tries, which makes intuitive sense.
A second set of explanatory variables intends to capture a chamber’s abilities to act in
the EWS. Previous studies that focused on EWS activity from a chamber’s point of view
explained variation in scrutiny as a function of the institutional strength of the chambers
(Auel et al., 2015a)4 and their internal capacity (Malang et al., 2019). We additionally in-
cluded the power of a Member State as a predictor. For all three factors, one should
hypothesise that stronger chambers are more likely sources within the diffusion network,
that is, they start the diffusion process because they have the resources to scrutinise pro-
posals on their own more efficiently. Related to that, one can also hypothesise that the dif-
ference in resources is crucial in the opinion process. Given the data and model, our
results neither indicate that the power of a country in the EU decision-making process,
nor show that the capacity of a chamber is a good predictor of diffusion ties. To the con-
trary, the OPAL score of institutional strength (Auel et al., 2015b) shows that the larger
the difference in strength, the more likely a diffusion relation exists. Combined with the
(albeit borderline non-significant) finding that stronger chambers are more likely the
source of diffusion, we can assume that stronger chambers are early adopters of opinions
that weaker chambers might follow.
Third, Bailer et al. (2015) found that net contributors to, and net recipients of, the Eu-
ropean Union budget had different preferences leading to distinct governmental behav-
iour in the Council. These patterns are mirrored somewhat in the Early Warning System
diffusion network as the two Central and Eastern European and Baltic communities are
all composed of net recipients of the EU budget. The importance of the economic dimen-
sion within the EWS is corroborated by our quantitative analysis. Here, the attribute of
being a net recipient is the second measure that reaches statistical significance on a tie
level. This means that rather than looking for powerful states or strong chambers, parlia-
ments align their EWS behaviour with chambers with the same economic preconditions.
Fourth, Williams (2016) showed that the public mood in terms of Euroscepticism in-
fluences the likelihood of submitting reasoned opinions. Parliaments representing more
Eurosceptic citizens submit more opinions. From a relational perspective, one could either
hypothesise that Eurosceptic parliaments are early adopters and trigger other chambers to
scrutinise a given proposal or that a cluster of Eurosceptic parliaments form around a set
of proposals they try to prevent. The first possibility should yield a sender effect for
Euroscepticism, the second one a distance effect between two chambers with regard to
Euroscepticism. However, there is insufficient statistical support to reject the null hypoth-
esis that Euroscepticism does not matter in these ways for the diffusion network.
Overall, we not only find qualitative evidence that there were influential parliaments in
the process of the three yellow cards that put their opinions forth early in the process, but
we also find statistical associations that help to explain tie formation in the diffusion
4Auel et al. (2015a) do not focus on reasoned opinions but on the political dialogue. However, their arguments can be
adopted for submissions of reasoned opinions.
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network. However, the majority of factors we tested seems irrelevant for the EWS back-
bone (though this might change with more data). The separation on the economic dimen-
sion between net recipients and contributing states seems to be the most consistent
explanation. Generally, the relative compartmentalisation of the diffusion network into
distinct communities with distinct identities and without much cross-cluster influence
might explain the small number of yellow cards that have materialised up to now.
Conclusion
The Early Warning System was introduced to reduce the democratic deficit of the Union,
giving elected national representatives an additional venue to participate in day-to-day
legislative politics. The institutional structure of the EWS incentivises coordination and
cooperation between national parliaments. Chambers with strong preferences against a
given legislative draft have an incentive to find ways to make their peers jump on the
bandwagon of expressing subsidiarity concerns. Chambers, legislators and parliamentary
administrations that are overstrained by the volume of proposals to scrutinise are likely to
look at other chambers’ behaviour as a cue regarding which proposals might be worth
scrutinising. The present contribution has inferred the backbone structure of this interde-
pendent behaviour within the EWS and first described, and then explained, these diffu-
sion patterns from a relational perspective.
The results show that the temporal sequence of raising subsidiarity concerns towards
EU legislation divides national chambers into several clusters, with only a few chambers
initiating stable diffusion patterns. At the chamber level, the Swedish parliament and the
Czech House of Representatives are responsible for initiating many opinion sequences,
which we interpret as a form of influence. At the subgroup level, our analysis revealed
four distinct diffusion communities, two comprising of states that joined the EU after
2004, one cluster headed by Sweden that contains a rather heterogeneous group of cham-
bers, and one cluster mainly composed of French and German chambers. Our statistical
results are best interpreted in terms of the economic dimension, that is, net recipients of
the EU budget raise subsidiarity concerns together.
Regarding the fundamental question if the EWS decreased the democratic deficit of the
EU, the fact that we found meaningful patterns of opinion diffusion could be interpreted
as a slight increase of the representative function of the EU (via national parliaments).
However, the normative added value of this new institution may be questioned if the
Early Warning System basically exhibits the same interest constellations as the Council
voting of the respective national governments. Combined with previous insights that
the party channel is one premium way of influence among national parliaments (Malang
et al., 2019), the Early Warning System could be viewed as largely ineffective because the
national parliaments exhibit diffusion pathways that are largely congruent with existing
institutional cleavage lines.
Two counter arguments exist to rescue the democratic value of the EWS: First, we
have not looked at the content of the reasoned opinions so far. It is an unsettled debate
if the EWS is mainly about the legal dimension (the concerns about subsidiarity) or a po-
litical one. Our results (especially the many non-significant factors in our analysis) still
leave room for the interpretation that the EWS delivers an additional dimension to Coun-
cil negotiations, namely to control the legal dimension of subsidiarity. Second, a recent
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study by van Gruisen and Huysmans (2020) showed that the Commission is more likely
to withdraw proposals that receive reasoned opinions. Even in the absence of yellow
cards, national elected representatives have a way of influencing European legislative
proposals. Hence, our observed diffusion pathways can be interpreted as an additional
layer to influence European policy making.
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